We give a framework for trapdoor-permutation-based sequential aggregate signatures (SAS) that unifies and simplifies prior work and leads to new results. The framework is based on ideal ciphers over large domains, which have recently been shown to be realizable in the random oracle model. The basic idea is to replace the random oracle in the full-domain-hash signature scheme with an ideal cipher. Each signer in sequence applies the ideal cipher, keyed by the message, to the output of the previous signer, and then inverts the trapdoor permutation on the result. We obtain different variants of the scheme by varying additional keying material in the ideal cipher and making different assumptions on the trapdoor permutation. In particular, we obtain the first scheme with lazy verification and signature size independent of the number of signers that does not rely on bilinear pairings.
Introduction
Aggregate signatures and their variants. Aggregate signature schemes (AS), introduced by Boneh et al. [6] (BGLS), allow n signatures on different messages produced by n different signers to be combined by any third party into a single short signature for greater efficiency, while maintaining the same security as n individual signatures. In this paper we are concerned with the more restricted sequential aggregate signatures (SAS), introduced by Lysyanskaya et al. (LMRS) [22] and further studied by [21, 5, 1, 24, 7, 17] . These schemes, while still maintaining the same security, require signers themselves to compute the aggregated signature in order, with the output of each signer (so-called "aggregate-so-far") used as input to the next during the signing process. This restriction turns out to be acceptable in several important applications of aggregate signatures, such as PKI certification chains and authenticated network routing protocols (e.g., BGPsec).
TDP-based SAS. Existing SAS constructions are usually based on trapdoor permutations (TDPs) [22, 1, 24, 7] or bilinear pairings [21, 1, 5, 17] . In this paper, we focus on improving and simplifying TDP-based SAS schemes, which are all in the random oracle (RO) model. We describe existing constructions below, and illustrate them in Figure 1 .
The first TDP-based SAS scheme, by Lysyanskaya et al. [22] (LMRS), is very similar to the full-domain-hash (FDH) signature scheme of Bellare and Rogaway [2] . Recall that in FDH, the hash function is modeled as a random oracle whose range is equal to the domain of the TDP, and the signer simply hashes the message and inverts the TDP on the hash output. In LMRS, the signer exlcusive-ors the previous signer's output together with the hash of the message before inverting the TDP. This procedure enabled the verifier to verify in reverse order of signing, because exclusive-or could be undone to obtain the previous signer's (alleged) output.
Unfortunately, this very simple construction is not secure, and two additional checks are used in LMRS to achieve security: first, each signer must ensure that the public keys of all preceding signers are "certified" -i.e., specify permutations; and second, each signer must verify the signature received from the previous signers before applying the signing operation. These two checks prevented fast signing; ideally, each signer would be able to sign independently of others, and verify when time permitted (this option is called "lazy verification" and was observed by Brogle et al. [7] to be crucial in authenticated network routing protocols).
In two successive works by Neven [24] and Brogle et al. [7] (BGR), these two additional checks were removed (permitting, in particular, lazy verification), but at a cost to simplicity and signature length. Neven's scheme eliminated the first check by introducing a Feistel-like structure with two hash functions, at the cost of lengthening the signature by a single hash value; BGR, building on top of Neven, eliminated the second check by lengthening the signature further by a short per-signer value. These two schemes were complex and had subtle security proofs.
Our framework. We give a new framework for TDP-based SAS schemes, which unifies and simplifies prior work as well as leads to improved constructions. We observe that in all three prior TDP-based schemes, the central design question was how to process the aggregate-so-far together with the message before applying the hard direction of the TDP; in all three, it was accomplished using some combination of exclusive-or and random-oracle hash operations which were designed to ensure that the aggregate-so-far could be recovered during verification. In other words, achieving invertibility in order to enable verification was a major design constraint.
Our idea is to build invertibility explicitly into the scheme. In our scheme, pictured in Figure 1 , we process the aggregate-so-far via a public random permutation (modeled as an ideal cipher), keyed by the message. In other words, our schemes are in the ideal ideal cipher model, where algorithms have access to a family of random permutations and their inverses. This model is typically used for blockcipher-based constructions, where a blockcipher like AES is modeled as an ideal cipher. In our work, the domain of the ideal cipher is that of the trapdoor permutation, which is usually much larger than the block-length of a typical block cipher like AES. Fortunately, as shown by a series of works [10, 12, 13, 14] we can replace arbitrary-length ideal ciphers by using 8 rounds of Feistel network, and obtain the same security in the random oracle as in the ideal cipher model using indifferentiability arguments [23] .
Our Results. Our framework not only simplifies prior work, but gives rise to more efficient aggregate signatures. Specifically, we obtain:
• A scheme that, like Neven's, does not require certified TDPs, but may permit shorter signatures than Neven's scheme, of length equal to the length of the TDP output.
BGR:
Ours:
Figure 1: Our framework, compared to LMRS, Neven, and BGR.
• A scheme that, like BGR, permits lazy verification, but retains constant-size signatures. This scheme is based on a stronger assumption of adaptive tag-based TDPs [20] instead of plain TDPs.
If one prefers to stay with plain TDPs, we also obtain a scheme that permits lazy verification and, like BGR, has signatures that grow with the number of signers, but still the signatures have the potential to be shorter than in BGR (with the same caveat as above). We do not compare computational costs of our scheme vs. Neven's and BGR's because the only difference is the (small) number of additional hashes, which is negligible compared to the cost of evaluating the TDP.
Main Technique: Chain-to-Zero Lemma. The security proofs for all our schemes are enabled by a lemma we prove about an ideal cipher keyed by descriptions of functions. We emphasize that the functions are unrelated to the ideal cipher itself, and that the cipher keyed by a function description results in permutation that is unrelated to the function. This lemma, which we call "Chain-to-Zero Lemma," states the following.
Let π k denote the ideal cipher with key k. Recall that accessing π and π −1 requires querying an oracle. Let f and g denote functions with the same domain and range as π; the function descriptions will also be used as keys for π (again, we emphasize that the resulting permutations π f and π g have nothing to do with f and g as functions). Suppose for some a, π g (a) = b, f (b) = c, and π f (c) = d. We will say that a, b is linked to c, d. In our schemes, linking corresponds to consecutive steps of the verification algorithm.
A sequence of values in which each pair is linked to the next pair defines a chain. Signature verification will make sure that the last element of a chain is 0. The Chain-to-Zero Lemma says that if the last element of the chain is 0, then with overwhelming probability it was formed via queries to π −1 rather than to π. In our security proofs, this lemma means that we can program the relevant queries to π −1 , and therefore a forgery can be used to break the underlying TDP.
RSA-based instantiations. The schemes we obtain via our framework are proven secure under claw-freeness of the underlying TDP, or adaptive claw-freeness in the tag-based TDPs case. For plain-TDP-based schemes, this means that we can use RSA assuming standard one-wayness. For the tag-based TDP scheme, we we can use RSA under a stronger assumption called the instance-independent RSA assumption [25] . This instantiation hashes to the exponent (an idea originating from [18] ), so verification is more expensive than for standard RSA.
Perspective and open problems. Compared to prior work, our framework pushes much of the complexity of security proofs to indifferentiability arguments that a Feistel network realizes an ideal cipher, and allows working with an ideal cipher as a clean abstraction. We point out two interesting directions for future work:
• Known proofs that a Feistel network is indifferentiable from an ideal cipher are lossy in the sense that the security guarantees obtained are weaker for a fixed domain size. We conjecture that a weaker property suffices to prove our Chain-to-Zero Lemma and can be realized via a tight proof. We leave proving or disproving this conjecture as an interesting direction for future work (and perhaps fewer Feistel rounds).
• The RSA-based instantiation of our tag-based TDP scheme has an expensive verification algorithm that performs a full exponentiation modulo N , and its security relies on a very strong assumption about RSA. It would be interesting to remove either of these drawbacks. We conjecture that one can actually prove a negative result here, namely that plain TDPs cannot be used to realize constant-size lazy-verifying SAS schemes in the RO model, in a black-box way.
Finally, we mention that an open problem is removing the use of ROs in TDP-based SAS schemes, although our framework does not shed any light on this issue.
Preliminaries

Notation and Conventions
Algorithms. If A is an algorithm then y ← A(x 1 , . . . , x n ; r) means we run A on inputs x 1 , . . . , x n and coins r and denote the output by y. By y ←$ A(x 1 , . . . , x n ) we denote the operation of picking r at random and letting y ← A(x 1 , . . . , x n ; r). By Pr [ P (x) : . . . ] we denote the probably that P (x) holds after the elided experiment is executed. Unless otherwise indicated, an algorithm may be randomized. "PPT" stands for "probabilistic polynomial time" and "PT" stands for "polynomial time." The security parameter is denoted k ∈ N. If we say that an algorithm is efficient we mean that it is PPT. All algorithms we consider are efficient unless indicated otherwise.
Strings and vectors.We denote by {0, 1} * the set of all (binary) strings, by {0, 1} n the set of all strings of length n ∈ N , and by {0, 1}
≥n the set of all strings of length at least n ∈ N. If a, b are strings then a b denotes an encoding from which a and b are uniquely recoverable. Vectors are denoted in boldface, for example x. We sometimes use set notation with vectors, so that the notation x ← x ∪ {x} means that the next empty position in x is assigned x. If X is a random variable over some (finite) probability space then E[X] denotes its expectation.
Tables. We use the term "table" to refer to an associative array implicitly initialized to empty. We use the pseudocode "Record x = T [y] in the X-table" to mean that x is put at index y in table T . We use the pseudocode "X-table entry x = T [y]" to refer to x as the value at index y in table T .
Simplifying conventions. We implicitly assume that an honestly generated secret key contains the matching public key. In experiments, we assume that an adversarially-provided public key can be parsed into the requisite form, and that if it contains a description of a function f then f is PT. This does not mean we assume public keys certified by a CA. Indeed, our requirement can be met by running f via inputting it and its input to some PT algorithm F , say universal machine that executes f on its input for a fixed amount of time; if f halts with some output then F outputs it as well, otherwise F outputs a default value. For simplicity, we also assume trapdoor permutations have domain {0, 1} k but discuss RSA-based instantiations in Appendix A and Section 7.
Claw-Freeness
Claw-free trapdoor permutations. A trapdoor permutation (TDP) generator F on input 1 k outputs a pair (f, f −1 , g) describing permutations f, g on {0, 1} k , and f −1 describing the inverse of f . For a claw-finding algorithm C and every k ∈ N, define its CF-advantage against F as
We say that F is a claw-free if Adv cf F ,C (·) is negligible for every PPT C. The permutation g is only used for security proofs. In our constructions, we will ignore g and write (f, f −1 ) ←$ F(1 k ), corresponding to the standard notion of trapdoor permutations.
(Adaptive) claw-free tag-based TDPs. A tag-based trapdoor permutation (TB-TDP) generator F tag with tag-space {0,
tag , g tag ) describing functions of two inputs: t ∈ {0, 1} τ (called the tag) and x ∈ {0, 1} k . For every tag t ∈ {0, 1} τ , f tag (t, ·), g tag (t, ·) are permutations and f −1 tag (t, ·) is the inverse of f tag (t, ·). For a claw-finding algorithm C and every k ∈ N, define its ACF-advantage against F tag as
where we require that C does not make a query of the form f −1 (t, ·) to its oracle. We say that F is adaptive claw-free if Adv cf F ,C (·) is negligible for every such PPT C. Intuitively, F is adaptive claw-free if it is hard to find a claw even given access to an inversion oracle for f that may be called on tags other than the challenge tag. The notion of adaptive claw-freeness is new to this work. It is an extension of the notion of adaptive one-wayness introduced by Kiltz et al. [20] .
Instantiations. Dodis and Reyzin [16] show that any homomorphic or randomly self-reducible trapdoor permutation, in particular RSA [26] is claw-free (with a tight security reduction to one-wayness).
The notion of adaptive one-wayness for trapdoor permutations) (and more generally trapdoor functions) was introduced by Kiltz et al. [20] . They show that RSA gives rise to an adaptive one-way tag-based TDP under the instance-independent RSA assumption (II-RSA). In Appendix A we show that the same construction yields an adaptive claw-free tag-based TDP. In the construction, computing the forward direction is slower than for standard RSA, as it performs an exponentiation where the exponent is the length of the modulus rather than a small constant.
Random Oracle Model
In the random oracle model [2] all parties (all algorithms and adversaries) have oracle access to a function ("the random oracle") H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * where for every x ∈ {0, 1} * the value of H(x) is chosen uniformly at random of some desired output length. By using standard domain separation, it is equivalent to give all parties oracle access to an unlimited number of independent random oracles H 1 , H 2 , . . . : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * . It is a well-known heuristic proposed by [2] to instantiate these oracles in practice via functions constructed appropriately from a cryptographic hash function.
Ideal Cipher Model
In the version of the ideal cipher model [27] we consider, all parties (again, all algorithms and adversaries) have oracle access to two functions ("the ideal cipher"):
where the first is such that for each K ∈ {0, 1} * and each input length n ≥ k, π(K, ·) is an independent random permutation on {0, 1}
n . The second is such that for each K ∈ {0, 1} * and each input length n ≥ k, π
n . Such a model has typically been used to analyze blockcipher-based constructions in the symmetric-key setting (see, e.g., [4] ), where the key length is fixed to the key length of the blockcipher and the input length is fixed to the block length.
Our constructions are in the public-key setting, the key length will be unbounded, and the input length will be at least as long as the input length of a trapdoor permutation (say 2048 bits in the case of RSA). To implement such an ideal cipher in the random oracle model, one can use a Feistel network. Indeed, in their seminal work, Coron et al. [10] show that a 14-round Feistel network, where the round functions are independent random oracles, is indifferentiable in the sense of Maurer et al. [23] from a random permutation, which can then be used to implement the ideal cipher in a straightforward way. Essentially, indifferentiability implies that any reduction using the random permutation can be translated to one in the random oracle model. A subsequent sequence of works [12, 13, 14] show that 8 rounds is sufficient; the minimal number of rounds is still open but known to be at least six. Unfortunately, none of these works are "tight" in the sense that the resulting reduction in the random oracle model will be very loose. An interesting question for future work is whether a weaker notion than indifferentiability from an ideal cipher suffices in our constructions.
Sequential Aggregate Signatures
Sequential aggregate signatures (SAS) were introduced by Lysyanskaya et al. [22] and were subsequently studied by [21, 5, 1, 24, 7, 17] . Following the work of Brogle et al. [7] and Fischlin et al. [17] (and in particular using terminology of the latter) we classify SAS schemes into two types: general and history-free. In a history-free scheme, the signing algorithm uses only on the current signer's secret key, the message, and the aggregate-so-far. In a general scheme, it may also use the public keys and messages of the previous signers.
The General Case
Syntax. A (general) sequential aggregate signature (SAS) scheme is a tuple SAS = (Kg, AggSign, AggVer) of algorithms defined as follows. The key-generation algorithm Kg on input 1 k outputs a public-key pk and matching secret-key sk. The aggregate signing algorithm AggSign on inputs a secret key sk i , message m i , aggregate-so-far σ i−1 and a list of pairs of public keys and messages ((pk 1 , m 1 ), . . . , (pk i−1 , m i−1 )) outputs a new aggregate signature σ i . The aggregate verification algorithm AggVer on inputs a list of public keys and messages (pk 1 , m 1 ), . . . , (pk i , m i ) and an aggregate signature σ i outputs a bit.
Security. The security notion we use is the same as that in [24, 7] and originates from [1] , who strengthen the original notion of [22] to allow repeating public keys (which they call "unrestricted" SAS). To a general SAS scheme SAS and a forger F we associate for every k ∈ N a (general) SAS-unforgeability experiment Exp sas-uf SAS,F (k) that runs in three phases:
• Setup: The experiment generates (pk, sk) ←$ Kg(1 k ).
• Attack: Next, the experiment runs F on input pk with oracle access to AggSign(sk, ·, ·, ·).
• Forgery: Eventually, F halts with output parsed as (pk 1 , m 1 ), . . . , (pk n , m n ), σ. The experiment outputs 1 iff:
(1) AggVer((pk 1 , m 1 ), . . . , (pk n , m n ), σ) outputs 1, (2) pk i * = pk for some 1 ≤ i * ≤ n, and (3) F did not make an oracle query of the form AggSign(sk, m i * , ((pk 1 , m 1 ) , . . . , (pk i * −1 , m i * −1 ))). Define the (general) SAS-unforgeability advantage of F as 
The History-Free Case
Syntax. A history-free sequential aggregate signature (HF-SAS) scheme is a tuple HF-SAS = (Kg, AggSign, AggVer) of algorithms defined as follows. The key-generation algorithm Kg on input 1 k outputs a public-key pk m 1 ) , . . . , (pk i , m i ) and aggregate signature σ outputs a bit.
Security. Security in the history-free case is more restrictive on what is considered to be a forgery by the adversary than in the general case. In particular, we follow Brogle et al. [7] in our formulation of security here but leave investigation of a stronger security model due to Fischlin et al. [17] for furtur work. (As noted by [7] , this strengthening is not needed in applications such as BGPsec.) To an HF-SAS scheme HF-SAS and a forger F be a forger we associate for every k ∈ N a history-free SAS unforgeability experiment Exp hf-sas-uf SAS,F (k) that runs in three phases:
• Attack: Next, the experiment runs F on input pk with oracle access to AggSign(sk, ·, ·).
(1) AggVer ((pk 1 , m 1 ) , . . . , (pk n , m n ), σ) outputs 1, (2) pk i * = pk for some 1 ≤ i * ≤ n, and (3) F did not make an oracle query of the form AggSign(sk, m i * , ·). Define the history-free SAS-unforgeability advantage of F as 
Message Recovery
We also consider sequential aggregate signature schemes with message recovery, following [3, 24] . The goal is to save on bandwidth. Here we replace the verification algorithm by a recovery algorithm, which we view as taking as inputs a list of public keys and an aggregate signature and outputting either a list of messages, with the intended meaning that the verifier accepts each message as authentic under the respective public key, or ⊥, indicating the aggregate signature is rejected.
Our Basic Schemes
We give three basic schemes: a general scheme (where the signing algorithm uses the public keys and messages of the previous signers in addition to the current signer's secret key and message), and two history-free schemes (where the signing algorithm uses only the current signer's secret key and message). In this section we only present the constructions and security theorems. We postpone the proofs since we later give our main lemma that unifies the proofs.
SAS 1 : A General Scheme
Let F be a trapdoor permutation generator. Define SAS 1 [F] = (Kg, AggSign, AggVer) in the ideal cipher model with input length of π and π −1 fixed to k ∈ N, and where Kg(1 k ) outputs (f, f −1 ) generated via F(1 k ) and: ((f 1 , m 1 
Alg AggVer ((f 1 , m 1 ) , . . . , (f n , m n ), σ) :
x n ← σ For i = n down to 1 do:
is aggregate-unforgeable in the ideal cipher model. In particular, suppose there is a forger F against SAS 1 [F] making at most q π ideal cipher queries and at most q S signing queries. Then there is a claw-finding algorithm C against F such that for every k ∈ N Adv sas-ufcma
The running-time of C is that of F plus minor bookkeeping.
SAS 2 : A History-Free Scheme with Randomized Signing
Let F be a trapdoor permutation generator and ρ = ρ(k) be an integer parameter. Define SAS 2 [F] = (Kg, AggSign, AggVer) where Kg(1 k ) outputs (f, f −1 ) generated via F(1 k ) and:
i , m i , σ i−1 ) : //This is for the ith signer in the sequence:
(σ n , (r 1 , . . . , r n )) ← σ x n ← σ n For i = n down to 1 do:
is aggregate-unforgeable in the ideal cipher model. In particular, suppose there is a forger F against SAS 2 [F] making at most q H queries to H, at most q π queries to the ideal cipher, and at most q S signing queries. Then there is a claw-finding algorithm C against F such that for every
SAS 3 : A History-Free Scheme with Deterministic Signing
To get intuition, we first sketch how to forge against SAS 2 [F] when randomness r i is simply omitted. Let K i = f i m i be the ideal cipher key that the i-th signer "thinks" it is using. Let K i = f i m i be the ideal cipher key derived from a message m i that it will be duped into signing, and let x i−1 be the real aggregate-so-far. We show how to derive a corresponding fake aggregate-so-far x i−1 . Let y i = π −1 (K i , x i−1 ) be the value that the i-th signer will apply f −1 i to. We want to make y i = π −1 (K i , x i−1 ), so that the i-th signer is duped. But this is easy: In order to force y i = π −1 (K i , x i−1 ), we only have to choose π −1 (K i , x i−1 ) = π −1 (K i , x i−1 ) and therefore
). In essence, to solve this issue we make f i depend on m i as well.
Our construction. Let F tag be a tag-based trapdoor permutation with tag-space {0, 1} τ . Let H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1}
τ be a hash function modeled as a random oracle. Define SAS 3 [F] = (Kg, AggSign, AggVer) where Kg(1 k ) outputs (f, f −1 ) generated via F tag (1 k ) and:
Algorithm AggVer ((f 1 , m 1 ) , . . . , (f n , m n ), σ) :
is aggregate-unforgeable in the ideal cipher and random oracle models. In particular, suppose there is a forger F against SAS 3 [F] making at most q H queries to the random oracle and at most q π queries to the ideal cipher. Then there is a claw-finding algorithm C against F tag such that for every k ∈ N Adv hf-sas-ufcma
The Chain-to-Zero Lemma
Here we give a main lemma that will unify security analyses of our schemes. The setting. Consider an adversary A executing in the ideal cipher model where the input and output length of the ideal cipher is fixed to k ∈ N, and where a key of the ideal cipher also describes a function f :
That is, A may submit a query to π of the form f, y to receive a random x ∈ {0, 1} k , or a query f, x to π −1 to receive a random y ∈ {0, 1} k .
2 For simplicity, we assume that A does not make the same query twice or ask redundant queries, i.e., does not ask for π −1 [f, x] if it already asked for π[f, y] for some y and got x in response, or vice versa.
Linking. We say that π-table entry
For intuition, one can think of a π-table entry x 0 = π[f 1 , y 1 ] as indicating that f 1 applied to something (which in our constructions correspond to an aggregate-so-far) yielded y 1 ; this entry is linked if the "something" is also stored in the π-table. See Figure 2 for a depiction. We inductively define a π-table entry x = π[f, y] to be chained to zero if x = 0 k or it is linked to an entry that is chained to zero. The length of the chain is defined naturally, where a chain consisting of a single entry 0 k = π[f 1 , y 1 ] has length one. We say that π-table entry x = π[f, y] is a forward query if it is defined upon A making a π query. Similarly, we say that π-table entry x = π[f, y] is a backward query if it is defined upon A making a π −1 query.
Lemma 5.1 (Chain-to-Zero Lemma) Consider an execution A in which it makes at mostueries. Define BAD π to be the event that some forward query gets chained to zero. Then
In the proof we will make use of the following claims.
k . Consider choosing random y 1 , . . . , y q ∈ {0, 1} k , and let Y max be the random variable giving the maximum over i of the size of the pre-image set of
Proof: Let Y i be the random variable giving the size of the pre-image set of f −1 (y i ). We compute
Above, for the first (in)equality we the fact that for a nonnegative integer-valued random variable X,
For the second inequality we use a union bound. For the last (in)equality we use that E[Y i ] = 1, because the expectation is simply the sum all pre-image set sizes divided by the total number of points. Now define Coll 1 to be the event that a forward query x i = π[f i+1 , y i+1 ] is such that it is linked to some already existing backward query x i−1 = π[f i , y i ], and Coll 2 to be the event that a backward query
is such that it is linked to some already existing query
Claim 5.3
In an execution A as above in which it makes at mostueries, we have Pr [ Coll ] ≤ q 2 /2 k .
Proof: We say that a forward query collides if satisfies the condition for Coll 1 , and similarly for a backward query and Coll 2 . After at most i backward queries have been made, define the random variable P i to give the the maximum over all such queries of the size of the pre-image set f −1 (y). We claim that after i queries, the probability a forward query collides is at most i/2 k . This is because for such a forward query x = π[f, y], we have
where the last inequality is by the claim above.
Now if x i−1 = π[f i , y i ] is a backward query then y i is random and independent, while for any existing query
Hence, by a union bound the total probability of collision is at most q 2 /2 k .
We are now ready to prove our main lemma.
Proof: (of Lemma 5.1) By a conditioning argument, we have
Now if BAD π occurs there are two possibilities, either some forward query x = π[f, y] gets chained to zero by a chain of length i = 1, or it gets chained to zero by a chain of length i > 1. If i = 1 this would mean that x = 0 k . Since x is random and independent, the probability of this is 2 −k . Summing over all possible queries, the probability that any forward query gets chained to zero by a chain of length one is at most q/2 k . Now suppose forward query x i = π[f i+1 , y i+1 ] gets chained to zero by a chain of length i > 1. Then there are two possibilities: this query is chained to zero immediately when it is defined, or later.
The first possibility would require that there is a π-table entry
= y i and the entry is already chained to zero by a chain of length i − 1. By induction on i,
is a backward query, so it would cause a collision.
For the second possibility, consider a query that completes the chain from x i−1 = π[f i , y i ] to zero. At the time it is asked, all the other entries in the chain are already fixed. That query itself must be chained to zero via a chain of length j, for some 1 ≤ j ≤ i − 1, so let us denote it by
The query number j + 1 in the chain, which we denote by x j = π[f j+1 , y j+1 ], must be linked to query number j, i.e., it must hold that f j (x j ) = y j . Because query number j − 1 must be chained to zero, again by (strong) induction on i it must be a backward query, so it would cause a collision.
This completes the proof.
Remark 5.4
The Chain-to-Zero Lemma can be extended in the following way. Instead of functions f : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} k we allow functions f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , for any n ≥ k, choose x and y in the game's pseudocode for answering A's queries of length n defined in the query, and define x = π[f, y] to be chained to zero if x = 0 k z n−k for any z ∈ {0, 1} n−k , where n is the input length of f . The statement of the lemma remains unchanged.
Proofs for the Basic Schemes
Here we give security proofs of our basic schemes, using the Chain-to-Zero Lemma. To simplify the proofs, we assume that no query of forger F to the ideal cipher is asked twice (even in reverse direction) and that all queries needed in a signing query and for verifying the final forgery are already asked.
Proof of Theorem 4.1
We give a simpler proof that loses a factor q π in the reduction rather than q S ; the improved reduction can be obtained via application of Coron's technique using biased coin flipping [9] .
Claw finder. Claw-finding algorithm C is given in Figure 3 .
Analysis. Let's consider executions of the general SAS-unforgeability experiment with F and of the claw-finding experiment with C over a common set of random coin sequences, where the same coins are used for choices common across both experiments. Using the terminology of Section 5, in the execution of C in its claw-finding experiment let BAD π be the event that any forward query is chained to zero and ABORT be the event that C aborts. Let FORGE be the event that F produces a valid forgery in its general SAS-unforgeability experiment. Then we have
The first inequality above is due to the fact that on coin sequences where C does not abort, the execution of F in its experiment and when run by C is identical. Hence, on such coin sequences F also forges in its execution by C. Now by the Chain-to-Zero Lemma (Lemma 5.1), we have
Next we claim that
To see this, note that there are two places C could abort: answering a signing query, or after receiving the final forgery. In answering a signing query, we know that the aggregate-so-far must verify (otherwise C returns ⊥), so π- 
was defined on the ctr * -th query, then C does not abort. This happens with probability at least 1/q π since ctr * is random and independent. To complete the proof, we claim that
To see this, first note that ABORT is independent of FORGE because the random choices made by C in determining whether to abort in its claw-finding experiment do not affect whether F forges in its SAS-unforgeability experiment. Thus
Combining the above, we have
and rearranging yields the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4.2
Claw finder. Claw-finding algorithm C is given in Figure 4 .
Analysis. Again, let's consider executions of the general SAS-unforgeability experiment with F and of the clawfinding experiment with C over a common set of random coin sequences with the same coins used for common choices across both experiments. Using the terminology of Section 5, in the execution of C in its claw-finding experiment let BAD π be the event that any forward query gets chained to zero. Also in the execution of C in its experiment, let BAD r be the event that π-table entry π[f m r, y] defined when C answers signing query of F was previously defined. Let FORGE be the event that F produces a valid forgery in its experiment. We claim that
Above, the first inequality is because on a coin sequences on which F forges in its experiment and on which no π-table entry defined when C answers a signing query in its experiment was previously defined, the executions of both experiments are identical. Hence, on such coin sequences F also forges in its execution by C. Moreover, since the final output of F is a valid forgery, we know that π-table entry x Algorithm C(f * , g * ) : ctr ← 0 ; ctr * ←$ {1, . . . , q π } Run F on input f * , answering its queries as follows: Algorithm C(f * , g * ) : Run F on input f * , answering its queries as follows: On π-query f m r, y do: query, and since C populates the g * -table on backwards queries, on such executions it can successfully find a claw. Finally, the last line is by the Chain-to-Zero Lemma. Now we claim Pr BAD r | BAD π ≤ q 2 S /2 ρ . This is because on each signing query r is chosen independently at random, in other words BAD r and BAD π are independent, and the probability that x = π[(f, m, r), y] is already defined on a given signing query is at most q S /2 ρ . Summing over all signing queries yields the claim.
Finally, we compute
where the last line uses the Chain-to-Zero Lemma. Combining terms yields the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4.3
Claw finder. Claw-finding algorithm C is given in Figure 5 .
Analysis. Again, let's consider executions of the history-free SAS-unforgeability experiment with F and of the adaptive claw-finding experiment with C over a common set of random coin sequences, where the same coins are used choices common across both experiments. And, in the execution of C, let BAD π be the event that any forward query is chained to zero. Let ABORT be the event that C aborts. Let FORGE be the event that F produces a valid forgery in its experiment. Then we have
The first inequality above is due to the fact that on coin sequences where C does not abort and no forward query made by F gets chained to zero, the execution of F in its experiment and when run by C is identical. Hence, on such coin sequences F also forges in its execution by C. Now by the Chain-to-Zero Lemma (Lemma 5.1), we have
Pr BAD π ≥ 1 − q 2 π /2 k .
Next we claim that
Pr ABORT | BAD π ≥ 1/q H · (1 − q H /2 τ ) .
To see this, note that there are three places C could abort: answering a hash query, answering a signing query, or after receiving the final forgery. Note that on each hash query where the "Else" is executed, we t = t * with probability 1/2 τ since t and t * are independent and random. Upon receiving the F 's final output, if it is a valid forgery then π- To see this, first note that ABORT is independent of FORGE because the random choices made by C in determining whether to abort in its claw-finding experiment do not affect whether F forges in its SAS-unforgeability experiment. Thus
Pr FORGE | ABORT ∧ BAD π = Pr FORGE | BAD π . 
Now
Extensions
We extend our basic schemes in a few ways. First, we add message recovery to them, so that we save on bandwidth. Second, we handle non-binary domains, as is needed for RSA-based instantiations.
Adding Message Recovery
To add message recovery to any of our schemes, the first signer can, instead of using the all-zeros string (of k-bits in length) as the first "aggregate-so-far," use n zero bits followed n − k bits of the message for n equal to security parameter (here we abuse notation and use n as the security parameter, say 128, while k is the length of the modulus, say 2048). The security proofs are identical except that they use the extension of the Chain-to-Zero Lemma discussed in Remark 5.4. This gives us only security parameters number of bits of bandwidth overhead from the signature for sufficiently long messages. One issue is that the public keys of the signers still contribute to bandwidth overhead. It would be interesting for future work to treat message recovery for sequential aggregate signatures in the identity-based setting, which avoids public keys, as considered by [5] .
Handling Non-Binary Domains
Our RSA-based instantiations in Appendix A have domain not {0, 1} k but Z N for per-signer N . The problem is that we may have a signer with modulus N i and a subsequent signer with modulus N i+1 such that N i+1 < N i . To handle this, there are two options. The first option is to append the fractional bit to the aggregate-so-far, so that the aggregate-so-far may grow by a bit per signer. This is quite modest growth, and in many applications such as S-BGP the number of signers is typically small. For highly bandwidth constrained applications, another option is to first convert the instantiation into one that does have a binary domain by using the technique of Hayashi, Okomoto, and Tanaka [19] . The idea is to exponentiate twice, reflecting the intermediate result about N . The downside is that this increases the cost of verification and signing by a factor of two.
